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This Note synthesizes a customary international standard of usage for automatic submarine
mines, taking into account existing international agreements and recent history. It then details
the questionable nature of recent mine use in Nicaragua and the Red Sea, as judged against the
synthesized standard, and the differing positions on acceptable standards of mine use asserted by
the United States.
"DAMN THE TORPEDOES!". INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS REGARDING THE USE OF
AUTOMATIC SUBMARINE MINES
INTRODUCTION
Automatic submarine contact mines' are weapons tradi-
tionally employed by nations at war. As such, they are regu-
lated by various international conventions.2 However, the re-
1. Automatic submarine mines first came into use during the United States Civil
War, when floating explosive devices were used to defend Confederate ports from
blockade by Union ships. See W. MALLISON, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1966:
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS
158 (1968). They gained notoriety in the Russo-Japanese War, when innocent com-
merce suffered great losses from mines that remained dangerous long after the
blockade of Port Arthur, in 1904. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 182a
(H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1954); see also infra note 37 (discussing Chinese losses). Gen-
erally, these mines required contact to detonate, and came in both floating and
anchored varieties. L. OPPENHEIM, supra, § 182a. The primary use of floating mines
occurred in belligerent actions on the high seas in that anchored mines were most
frequently used in the territorial waters of belligerents to help effect a blockade. See
infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
In the World Wars, the mines used no longer required contact to detonate them.
Instead, vibration-sensitive and magnetically detonated mines became the norm. See
2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra, § 182a. Mines could be laid by ships, by submarines through
their torpedo tubes, or from airplanes by parachute, as well. Id. During the Wars,
mines of all varieties were used on the high seas to close large areas to enemy and
neutral passage alike. Id.
Today, all of these kinds of mines remain in use. See How to Block a Harbor, Time,
Apr. 23, 1984, at 20. New kinds of mines have been developed which can differenti-
ate between minesweeping attempts and the passage of more substantial targets. See
D. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 92, 96 (1975). Also, mines
may be programmed to progress under their own propulsion at low speeds to prede-
termined areas at some distance from where they are first laid. Id. at 96. This last
kind of mine lies beyond the scope of this Note for the reason that it is essentially a
slow moving torpedo, rather than a mine. In particular, it is designed to perform a
function that could arguably be considered illegal today if it were considered to be a
mine, i.e. it is programmed to wander in a manner prejudicial to peaceful shipping.
For these reasons, it lies outside the scope of the standards discussed infra.
2. The international convention directly applicable to the use of automatic sub-
marine mines is the Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Con-
tact Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541, 205 Parry's T.S. 331 (1907)
[hereinafter cited as Hague Convention]; see infra notes 55-61 (full text of articles 1-
6). The United Nations Charter governs the use of force in international relations.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 51 & preface. Its effect on contemporary standards of
mines use is discussed infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. Lastly, the holding
of the International Court of Justice in Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4
(Judgment of Apr. 9), delineates a peacetime standard for mine use. This standard is
discussed infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
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cent belligerent 3 use of mines by insurgents4 and terrorists
5
not party to these international agreements raises questions
about the legality of mines and the appropriate manner of their
use. Recent events have brought to light the continuing dan-
ger of unrestrained use of mines to a neutral state's 6 shipping.
7
Such use is a deadly force beyond the control of the belligerent
parties in that mines may wander both spatially and temporally
from the zone of hostilities.8 In so doing, they pose a threat to
neutral parties, who may be attacked without warning or
cause.9 The way to protect neutral shipping is through a con-
vention creating a standard of mine use. A standard will per-
mit neutrals to formulate expectations as to when the broad
3. Belligerents are opposing parties to an armed contention between states. See
2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § § 53-56. Such an armed contention, otherwise known
as war, is characterized by violent and other measures by the belligerents designed to
overthrow one another and impose such conditions of peace as the victor may please.
Id. § 54.
4. Insurgents are parties to an armed internal conflict with a sovereign author-
ity, who attempt by violent and other means to secure control of the territory of the
sovereign state, with the goal of exercising governmental control over the populace.
See I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 75a. Once an insurgency enjoys partial success,
third parties may recognize the parties as belligerents, invoking the laws of war
proper. Id.; see infra note 21 (discussing the laws of war). Until that time, third par-
ties may, without making a formal pronouncement and without conceding to the re-
bellious forces belligerent rights affecting foreign nationals, refrain from treating
them as law-breakers. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 75a. This is true as long as
they do not arrogate to themselves the right to interfere with foreign subjects outside
the territory occupied by them. Id.
5. Terrorists are extremist individuals or groups who employ violence to achieve
essentially political goals. See Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY 13, 13 (1975). Terrorists engage in
acts which in themselves may be classic forms of criminal conduct, but which are
executed "with the deliberate intention of causing panic, disorder and terror within
an organized society, in order to destroy social discipline, paralyse the forces of reac-
tion of a society, and increase the misery and suffering of the community." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
6. Neutral states have been defined as:
Such States as do not take part in a war between other States are neu-
trals. . . . Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of impartiality adopted
by third States towards belligerents and recognized by belligerents, such at-
titude creating rights and duties between the impartial States and the bel-
ligerents. Whether or not a third State will adopt an attitude of impartiality
at the outbreak of a war is . . . a matter . . . for international politics.
2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 293 (footnote omitted).
7. These recent events are detailed infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text,
and are analyzed infra notes 177-208 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
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right to trade on the seas may be infringed by the limited right
to war on the seas.' 0 Through knowledge of the norms of
mine use and knowledge of the actual employment and place-
ment of mines, the neutral may then tend to its own best
interest.
In 1984, it became apparent that automatic submarine
contact mines posed a problem of global concern. Use of
mines by insurgents in Nicaragua became news in February.ii
By April, when the mining ended and the harbors were
swept,12 twelve vessels from the Soviet Union and five other
nations had been damaged.' 3 In July, mysterious explosions
caused damage to vessels traversing the Red Sea and Gulf of
10. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface.
11. On February 25, 1984, two Nicaraguan fishing boats struck mines and sank
near Bluefields, the largest town on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. See Kinzer, Nicaragua,
Citing Raids, Says Rebels Have New Skills, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1984, at A3, col. 4. Two
crewmen were lost and seven injured. Id. Two other vessels were reported damaged
in the incident. Id.
12. Mines are generally removed after hostilities have ended, either by the
power that laid them, on the high seas, or by the country in whose territorial waters
they lay. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; infra note 59 (for text of article
5). This function is generally performed by specially equipped ships that search ar-
eas known to be mined, locate the mines, and detonate them by various means. See,
e.g., I. CHUNG, LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE CORFU CHANNEL INCIDENT 26
(1959). The United States now employs helicopters for this task. See Biddle, U.S.
Weighs Move to Help Egypt Rid Red Sea of Mines, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1984, at AI, col. 6.
13. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Says No Mines Are Left in Nation's Ports, N.Y. Times, Apr.
13, 1984, at Al, col. 1; see also Taubman, Mine Fields: President's 'Secret War' in Nicara-
gua Backfires, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, § 4, at 1, col. 1. On March 1, 1984, the
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, a Nicaraguan insurgent group based in neigh-
boring Costa Rica, declared that it had mined Corinto, Nicaragua's largest Pacific
port, and El Bluff, a port on the Atlantic coast. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Port Thought to
Be Mined, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984, at A3, col. 3. The group stated that their pur-
pose in mining the harbors was to prevent the arrival of military supplies from the
Soviet bloc. Id. The group further declared: "The coasts of Nicaragua are a war
zone, and therefore we are not responsible for loss of civilian lives in this zone." Id.
(quoting a Democratic Revolutionary Alliance release).
On March 3, 1984, a large Dutch dredging vessel sustained an estimated U.S.$1
million in damage when it struck a mine off Corinto. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Port
Thought to Be Mined, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984, at A3, col. 3; Nicaragua Reports
Freighter Damaged by Mine Is Sinking, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1984, at A4, col. 4. A report
prepared by the Dutch Navy concluded that the explosion which damaged the Geo-
potes VI was caused by a mine activated by the sound or vibration of the passing
dredger. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Port Thought to Be Mined, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984,
at A3, col. 3. The report stated that this type of mine is usually not anchored to the
seabed. Id. An average specimen of this kind of mine is six feet long and carries
about 220 pounds of explosive. Id.
On March 7, 1984, the Los Caribes, a Panamanian freighter, struck a mine near
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Suez.' 4 By the time the United States withdrew from interna-
tional minesweeping efforts in September, eighteen ships had
been damaged.1 5 In the Nicaraguan incidents there was loss of
life, as well as property damage.' 6 Anti-Sandinista rebels have
Corinto. See Nicaragua Reports Freighter Damaged by Mine Is Sinking, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1984, at A4, col. 4. The freighter carried medicine bound for Nicaragua. Id.
On March 20, 1984, a Soviet freighter struck a mine upon entering Porto
Sandino, injuring five seamen. See Soviet Tanker Damaged by Mine Laid by Rebels in Nica-
raguan Port, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1984, at A4, col. 3. March 29, 1984 saw two Nicara-
guan cargo boats, the San Albano and the Aracely Peres, join the list of vessels to strike
mines while entering the harbor at Corinto. See Two Nicaraguan Ships Strike Mines Near
Port, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1984, at A4, col. 6. Both vessels were owned by Alinsa, a
Nicaraguan company. Id.
On April 8, 1984, Reagan Administration officials revealed that not only were
American money and technology behind the use of mines by Nicaraguan rebels, but
that non-American, non-Nicaraguan employees of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) actually entered Nicarguan territorial waters and laid the mines for the insur-
gents. See Taubman, Americans On Ship Said to Supervise Nicaragua Mining, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 8, 1984, at Al, col. 6; infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing the
naval capabilities of Nicaraguan rebels). The CIA then coordinated the distribution
of credit for the minings between the various insurgent groups with which they dealt.
See C.LA. Threats Said to Influence Rebels, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1984, at A10, col. 1. The
CIA reported to the press that American citizens who were involved in the mining
operations did not enter Nicaraguan territorial waters. See Taubman, Americans on
Ship Said to Supervise Nicaragua Mining, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, at Al, col. 6. Admin-
istration officials later reported that the mines were handmade in Honduras by CIA
technicians, and further elaborated that the mines were sophisticated devices in-
tended to damage ships but not sink them, so that any Soviet bloc boat loaded with
explosives would stay well clear of the harbors. See Kinzer, Mining to Continue, Rebel
Chief Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at A10, col. 1.
Reagan Administration officials said that three kinds of mines were used: direct
contact detonated, sound wave sensitive, and water pressure detonated. See Taub-
man, Americans on Ship Said to Supervise Nicaragua Mining, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, at
Al, col. 6, at A12, col. 3. They also stressed that the mines were programmed to
become harmless within a few months. Id.
On April 12, 1984, the Nicaraguan Chief of Staff, Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, said
he believed that Nicaraguan Government efforts had successfully cleared the coun-
try's harbors of all mines. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Says No Mines Are Left in Nation's
Ports, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at Al, col. 1. At the time of this statement, a dozen
vessels in all had struck mines since February. Id. These ships hailed from diverse
nations, including Japan, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. Id. Captain Mario
Alem~m of the Sandinista Navy announced at the same time that government
soldiers had touched off at least 29 mines while sweeping the harbor at Corinto. Id.
at A5, col. 1.
14. See Miller, 'Minelike' Object Off Egypt Is Linked to Russians, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1984, at A13, col. 1.
15. Id.
16. Two Nicaraguans were lost in the incidents of February 25, 1984, off Blue-
fields. See Kinzer, Nicaragua, Citing Raids, Says Rebels Have New Skills, N.Y. Times, Mar.
7, 1984, at A3, col. 2.
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claimed responsibility for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors' 7
and the United States Government has also acknowledged a
role in the laying of the mines.' 8 To date no person or group
has claimed responsibility for the Middle Eastern incidents.' 9
The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 includes
the Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines2" (Hague Convention). This Convention is part
of the international body of law popularly known as the law of
war, intended to limit the damage caused by war.2' While
some of the laws of war seek to impose limits on belligerents
17. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Port Thought To Be Mined, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984,
at A3, col. 3.
18. REPORT OF THE SELECT SENATE COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 665,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984). The report to Congress stated: "[W]ithout notifying
the [Select] Committee . . . major changes were made in the conduct of this pro-
gram, including the mining of Nicaragua's harbors. The Committee was not in-
formed of these actions until after they were substantially accomplished. Only upon
subsequent inquiries was the nature of U.S. involvement ascertained." Id.
19. The New York Times reported this fact on September 25, 1984. See Miller,
'Minelike' Object OffEgypt Is Linked to Russians, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at A13, col.
1. No further developments have arisen.
20. Hague Convention, supra note 2.
21. The Convention is discussed in 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a (the
second volume is devoted to Disputes, War and Neutrality). The laws of war,'gov-
erning the relationships between belligerents inter se, and between belligerents and
neutrals, trace their origins to the late middle ages. Id. § 67. Usages and customs of
war became widespread following the Napoleonic Wars, though codification in the
form of international agreements did not begin to take place until the Declaration of
Paris of 1856. Id. § 68. The four rules of the Declaration are listed infra note 36.
The Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906 regarding land warfare, and the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907, together with the Declaration of Paris, form the foun-
dation of the modern laws of war. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 68.
The rationale behind the laws of war is tripartite. Id. § 67. Initially, a belligerent
is justified in applying any amount and any kind of force which is necessary for the
realization of the purpose of war, the overpowering of the opponent. Id. In restric-
tion, the principle of humanity postulates that all such kinds and degrees of violence
not necessary for the overpowering of the opponent should not be permitted. Id.
Finally, there is chivalry, which emerged from the Middle Ages and developed into
modern notions of fair play and proportionality of aggression and response. Id.
For an excellent historical summary of the codification of the laws of war, and
current issues in the area, see generally LAw AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE: THE
VIETNAM EXPERIENCE 4-34 (P. Trooboff ed. 1975). Following World War II, the
founding of the United Nations added a dimension to the legal regulation of war.
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS iv (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ed.
1971). By adherence to U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, signatories renounced the use
of force in international relations. While this effectively outlawed war, except in re-
prisal, discussed infra note 77, war did not cease among nations, and the need for
humanizing laws remains. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at iv. The existence
of rules of war in no way legitimizes the conflict made illegal by the UN Charter. On
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regarding one another, the Hague Convention is directed to-
ward the protection of neutrals.22 The widespread adoption of
the Hague Convention 23 created a standard for customary in-
ternational law much like that later fostered by the Charter of
the United Nations.24
Although compliance with the standards of the Hague
Convention has been irregular,25 the existence of a customary
the contrary, the law of war may be "all that stands between the minimum standards
of civilization and unbridled barbarity." Id.
22. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface; infra notes 63-64 and accompa-
nying text (quoting from the preface).
23. The original signatories are the United States of America, Argentine Repub-
lic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Gua-
temala, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Nether-
lands, Peru, Persia (now Iran, and not currently a responsible international actor),
Romania, Salvador, Servia (which has since become a part of Yugoslavia), Siam (now
Thailand), Switzerland, Ottoman Empire (now Turkey), Uruguay, and Venezuela. See
Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface. Later signatories include: India, Russia,
China, Sweden, Portugal, and Nicaragua. Annex to the United Kingdom Memorial,
(U.K. v. Aib.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 400 (signatories of the Hague Convention at the
time of Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9)).
24. See R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1963); M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH,
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 240-45 (1961). One author ex-
plains the reasons why the United Nations is an appropriate body to look to for de-
velopments in international law as follows:
[I]nternational custom is to be deduced from the practice of states, which
includes their international dealings as manifested by their diplomatic ac-
tions and public pronouncements. With the development of international
organizations, the votes and views of states have come to have legal signifi-
cance as evidence of customary law. Moreover, the practice of states com-
prises their collective acts as well as the total of their individual acts; and the
number of occasions on which states see fit to act collectively has been
greatly increased by the activities of international organizations. Collective
acts of states, repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers with suffi-
cient frequency, eventually attain the status of law. The existence of the
United Nations-and especially its accelerated trend towards universality of
membership since 1955-now provides a very clear, very concentrated, focal
point for state practice.
R. HIGGINS, supra, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
25. The initial offender was Germany, which completely ignored the provisions
of the Convention in both World Wars. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a: see also
THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA §§ 562-68 (C. Colombos 5th ed. 1962). This
infringement constituted only a small portion of a much larger pattern of illegality in
the waging of war. See generally 3 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a. Germany was
not the only country to ignore or bend the provisions of the Convention. Id. § 182a.
For further discussion, see infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
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standard of mine use is not precluded. 26 An examination of
the considerations that prompted the Hague Convention and
an examination of the actual usage of mines by the major pow-
ers in the years since 1907 yields a consistent series of norms
beyond which states do not go. 2 7 Application of this custom-
ary standard to the recent use of mines in Nicaragua and the
Red Sea reveals a notable lack of consideration for the safety of
peaceful shipping as well as a violation of the customary inter-
national standard.28 Liability for the damage caused by misuse
of mines remains unassigned and unclear due to a present in-
sufficiency of facts.29 Nevertheless, there are inconsistencies in
the expressed policies of the United States concerning the use
of automatic submarine mines, specifically, the irreconcilable
nature of the United States' condemnation of the Red Sea min-
ing coeval with its approval of similar activity in Nicaragua. 30
This Note synthesizes a customary international standard
of usage for automatic submarine mines, taking into account
existing international agreements3 I and recent history. 32  It
then details the questionable nature of recent mine use in Nic-
aragua and the Red Sea, as judged against the synthesized
standard, 33  and the differing positions on acceptable stan-
dards of mine use asserted by the United States. 4
26. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA supra note 25, § 2. The importance
of a customary standard is explained as follows:
Custom is the most important source of the international law of the sea and
usages of the great maritime States must therefore always exercise a weighty
influence on its development. There is good justification for such a claim on
the ground that the Powers most concerned with a subject are able to under-
stand it best. The value of custom as a source of international law was em-
phasised by ChiefJustice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court... :
"The usage of nations becomes law and that which is an established rule of
practice is a rule of law."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.(7 Pet.) 51
(1833)).
27. See infra notes 35-176 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 177-208 and accompanying text.
29. See Miller, 'Minelike' Object Off Egypt Linked to Russians, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1984, at A13, col. 1. No new development has arisen.
30. See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 2 (listing the existing international agreements relevant to the
regulation of lawful mine use).
32. See infra notes 35-146 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
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I. PURPOSES AND PROPOSALS OF THE SECOND HAGUE
PEACE CONFERENCE
The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907"5 consid-
ered the expansion of then existing international rules dating
from the Declaration of Paris of 1856,36 as well as the formula-
tion of new rules concerning the legality and appropriate use
35. Hague Convention, supra note 2. The First Peace Conference at the Hague,
in 1899, was convened at the behest of Czar Nicholas II of Russia and was motivated
by a desire to limit the current arms race among European powers. Rescript of the
Russian Emperor (August 24, 1898) (handed to diplomatic representatives by Count
Mourvieff, Russian Foreign Minister, at the weekly reception in the Foreign Office,
St. Petersburg, Aug. 24, 1898), reprinted in 2 J. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFER-
ENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 1-2 (1909). His invitation stated, in part:
The economic crises, due in great part to the system of armaments d I' ou-
trance, and the continual danger which lies in this massing of war material,
are transforming the armed peace of our day into a crushing burden, which
the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident,
then, that if this state of things were prolonged, it would inevitably lead to
the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which
make every thinking man shudder in advance.
To put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the means of ward-
ing off the calamities which are threatening the whole world-such is the
supreme duty which is today imposed on all States.
Id. at 2. However, the Conference was more successful for advances it made in codi-
fying international law and in restricting certain kinds of weapons, than in reducing
the rate of increase of military forces. See C. DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 25-27 (1975). See generally W. HULL, THE Two
HAGUE CONFERENCES 68-69 (1908). The Second Peace Conference was much more
widely attended than the First, as it included Central and South American countries
not invited to the Conference of 1899. See IJ. SCOTT, supra, at 155. While Russia still
chaired the Conference, its role was not the leading one it had played previously. Id.
at 161. The principal lasting effects of the Second Conference are its provisions for
the laws of naval warfare. W. HULL, supra, at 479-80. M. Nelidow, president of the
Second Conference, declared in his final address to the Conference that praise or
criticism of the Conference would be equivalent to praise or criticism of the code of
maritime law which it adopted-even more so than its accomplishments in the area of
arbitration. Id.
36. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law between Austria, France, Great Brit-
ain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia & Turkey, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Parry's T.S. 1 (1856).
The Declaration has been summarized as follows:
The Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856, respect[ed] warfare on the sea.
It abolished privateering, recognized the principles that the neutral flag pro-
tects non-contraband enemy goods, and that non-contraband neutral goods
under an enemy flag cannot be seized, and enacted the rule that a blockade
in order to be binding must be effective. The Declaration was signed by
seven States, but almost all other maritime Powers acceded in course of
time.
2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 68; see C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 11-12.
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of automatic submarine contact mines." Behind the proposals
of the Conference stood the politics of force. Countries with
small navies wanted liberal rules regarding mines, because
cheap and easily deployed mines distinctly favor a country with
a small navy over a country with a large navy.38 Mines allow
the protection of long stretches of coastline with few ships and
they also enable a small fleet to hold a large fleet at bay.3 9 A
country with a large navy and merchant fleet could not use
mines effectively for defense, because they would hamper the
movement of ships in and out of harbors,4" and pose a con-
stant threat to maritime traffic of any significant volume in
times of heavy weather. 4' Great Britain, in particular, suffered
these disadvantages. It had many ports, a proportionately
greater amount of coastline to defend, and the largest mer-
chant fleet in the world.42
Whether motivated by idealism or pragmatism, Great Brit-
ain took the initiative with the following proposals: 1) that un-
anchored mines be prohibited altogether; 2) that anchored
37. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, §§ 67-68. These mines had not been a
concern at the Conference of 1899, but had risen to notoriety in the 1904 blockade of
Port Arthur, during the Russo-Japanese War, when unrestrained mine use had led to
enormous civilian casualties. Id. § 182a. The Chinese government was obliged to
supply its coastal ships with equipment to sweep and destroy mines left drifting even
more than one year after that conflict had ended. I J. ScoTr, supra note 35, at 576
(quoting the Declaration of the Chinese Delegation, 3 LA DEUXIEME CONFERENCE IN-
TERNATIONALE DE LA PAIx 663 (1907)). The Chinese delegation informed a shocked
Conference that some 500-600 Chinese subjects had perished, unreported by the
world press, in the pursuit of their livelihoods as fishermen and coastal traders. Id.
This prompted Britain's delegate, Captain C. L. Ottley, to his own famous remark:
That if the mines the Chinese complained of floated off Dover or Gibraltar "a series
of catastrophes would have occurred that would have riveted the attention of the
civilized world to the question [of mine safety]." C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 245
(quoting 3 LA DEUXIEME CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE DE LA PAIx 523-24 (1907)).
Because the demonstrated destruction caused by unrestricted mine warfare was
of great concern at the Conference, M. Francis Hagerup, the delegate of Norway and
president of the first subcommission of the III Commission, was prompted to say that
while drawing up an acceptable convention regarding mines was undoubtedly the
most technically difficult task facing the Conference, it might well prove of greatest
value to humanity and peace. W. HULL, supra note 35, at 93.
38. See I J. ScoTr, supra note 35, at 579-80. See generally W. HULL, supra note 35,
at 96.
39. Such was the observation of Commander Burlamaqui de Moura, of Brazil.
C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 246; see I J. ScoTr, supra note 35, at 579-80.
40. See I J. SCOTT, supra note 35, at 579-80.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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mines be manufactured so as to become harmless when free of
their tethers; 3) that mine use to impose commercial block-
ages 43 be prohibited; and 4) that mine use anywhere but within
the territorial waters44 of the belligerents be prohibited except
within a ten-mile zone in front of naval forts.45 The British
proposal was so restrictive that other delegates offered liberal-
izing amendments including proposals that belligerents should
have the right to use short-lived unanchored mines; 46 that bel-
43. A blockade may be explained as:
[T]he interception by sea of the approaches to the coasts or ports of an
enemy with the purpose of cutting off all his overseas communications. Its
object is not only to stop the importation of supplies but to prevent export
as well.
[O]nce a blockade of any portion of the enemy's coast, or of any of his ports,
has been declared, all merchant ships and cargoes, of whatever description
and of whatever nationality they may be, which are attempting to enter or
leave the blockaded area, are subject to confiscation. The nature of the
cargo on board such ships is irrelevant; it is solely the fact that the ship is
endeavoring to enter or leave a blockaded port or coast that is material.
Access to the blockaded area is prohibited to all warships and merchant ves-
sels. As a matter of international courtesy, however, this strict belligerent
right is waived in the case of neutral warships. It is also generally waived, on
humanitarian grounds, in favour of neutral merchantmen which find them-
selves in distress or are engaged in some philanthropic mission.
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 25, § 813 (footnote omitted).
44. Territorial waters may be defined as:
[T]hat part of the sea which extends from a line running parallel to the
shore to a specified distance therefrom, commonly fixed by the majority of
maritime States at three miles measured from low-water mark. All waters
outside territorial waters are to be considered as forming part of the high
sea. . . .This mile is the same as the geographic mile of 60 to a degree of
latitude and is equivalent to 1853 metres.
Id. § 97. Nicaragua claims territorial waters fixed at 12 miles measured from the low-
water mark. See Taubman, Americans on Ship Said to Supervise Nicaragua Mining, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 8, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
45. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 25, § 562; see also W.
HULL, supra note 35, at 94; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a. The Chinese,
whose problems had already been made known to the committee, were the only dele-
gation to support the British proposal wholly, citing a "large humanity." W. HULL,
supra note 35, at 94.
46. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a. The British proposal was too re-
strictive to other delegations who felt that floating mines had legitimate uses in bat-
tle. One such legitimate use is against a pursuing ship. Id. Italy championed this
view; Germany concurred. See also 1 J. Scorr, supra note 35, at 581. In order to
preserve these benefits of floating mine use, while still protecting neutral shipping,
Italy and Japan both suggested that a belligerent should have the right to use floating
mines which become harmless "within one hour after they are launched," or "after a
duration of submersion restricted in such a way as to present no danger to neutral
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ligerents should have the right to use mines in the theatre of
war;47 and that neutrals should be accorded the use of mines in
defense of neutrality.48
To aid in analyzing the development of a standard of mine
use, it is helpful to define the variables important in the em-
ployment of mines. Mine use can be broken down into a series
of issues which determine when, why, how, and where mines
are used.49 These variables are:
1) Whether mine use occurs during war or during peace;
2) Whether mines are employed for belligerent purposes or
for neutral purposes;
3) Whether mines are either anchored or unanchored,
whether mines have some kind of time limitation, and whether
the use of mines is accompanied by notification to neutrals;
4) Whether mine use occurs within the territorial waters of a
country, or on the high seas.
II. PROVISIONS OF CONVENTION VIII OF THE SECOND
PEACE CONFERENCE
In the long process of reaching a compromise, and arriv-
ing at a series of principles to place before the Conference, the
following points of agreement became evident: 1) All mines
should contain some timing mechanism limiting their deadli-
ness;50 2) A fundamental distinction needed to be recognized
between anchored and unanchored or floating mines;5 1 and
3) The localities in which the mines might legitimately be used
should be defined.52 No compromise between major and mi-
vessels outside the immediate sphere of hostilities." See W. HULL, supra note 35, at
95; see also C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 245.
47. W. HULL, supra note 35, at 95. Admiral Siegal of Germany insisted that bel-
ligerents should not be restricted in use of mines to their own or each other's territo-
rial waters, but rather should be permitted to use them in the "theater of war." Id.
That is, "on the space of sea on which warlike operation is being carried out or has
just been carried out or on which such operation may result from the presence or the
approach of the armed forces of the two belligerents." Id.
48. See id. Both the Netherlands and Brazil held this view. See id.; see also C.
DAVIS, supra note 35, at 246.
49. This formulation of the issues will serve as a convenient format for compari-
son of various standards of mine use in the remainder of this Note.
50. C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 246.
51. See W. HULL, supra note 35, at 96.
52. Id. The first subcommission's report to the III Commission found:
As to cabled mines, it is necessary to restrict their use within certain places;
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nor naval powers53 could assure the complete protection and
freedom of neutral shipping, but with the signing of the Hague
Convention important and substantial steps were taken toward
creating an analytical framework54 within which the legality of
mine use could be evaluated.
A. The Compromise Articles
Article 1 of the Hague Convention forbids the laying of
unanchored mines without a one hour time limit, and the lay-
ing of anchored mines that do not become harmless when free
of their anchorage.5" Article 2 forbids the laying of mines off
the coasts of the enemy for the sole purpose of intercepting
commercial shipping.5 6 Article 3 governs the use of anchored
mines. It mandates that every precaution must be taken to
protect neutral shipping, by requiring belligerents to render
mines harmless within a reasonable time, and notify neutrals of
the danger zones.5 Article 4 indicates that neutral powers
but since this restriction can not be absolute, and since it can not preclude
the possibility of placing them in places where peaceful navigation should be
able to count on free access, it is necessary to restrict cabled mines also
within a limit of time during which they may continue dangerous.
Id. (quoting the first subcommission's report to the III Commission).
53. The balance of naval strength in 1907 rested with Japan, France, the United
Kingdom, and Russia, while the United States, Italy, Austria, and Germany held sig-
nificant, but lesser naval power. See J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 604 n.9 (1959).
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. Article 1 provides as follows:
It is forbidden:
1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are
so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person
who laid them ceases to control them;
2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become
harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings;
3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have
missed their mark.
Id.
56. Id. art. 2. Article 2 provides as follows: "It is forbidden to lay automatic
contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of inter-
cepting commercial shipping." Id.
57. Id. art. 3. Article 3 provides as follows:
When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible pre-
caution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.
The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these mines
harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under surveil-
lance, to notify the danger zones as soon as mililtary exigencies permit, by a
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who lay mines will be bound by the same rules as belligerents,
and that notice must be given to mariners in advance.58 Article
5 requires that powers remove their own mines after war, as
well as all mines in their waters.59 They must also notify other
powers of the location of mines in their waters. 60 Article 6 re-
quired that powers conform any existing mines with articles 1
through 5. 61 The remaining seven articles cover procedural
aspects of the Convention.62
B. The Standard Proposed by the Convention
The chief priority of the Hague Convention is the princi-
ple of the freedom of the seas as the common highway of all
notice addressed to ship owners, which must also be communicated to the
governments through the diplomatic channel.
Id.
58. Id. art. 4. Article 4 provides as follows:
Neutral powers which lay automatic contact mines off their coasts must
observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed on
belligerents.
The neutral power must inform ship owners, by a notice issued in ad-
vance, where automatic contact mines have been laid. This notice must be
communicated at once to the governments through the diplomatic channel.
Id.
59. Id. art. 5. Article 5 provides as follows:
At the close of the war, the contracting powers undertake to do their
utmost to remove the mines which they had laid, each power removing its
own mines.
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the bel-
ligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the
other party by the power which laid them, and each power must proceed
with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 6. Article 6 provides as follows:
The contracting powers which do not at present own perfected mines of the
pattern contemplated in the present convention, and which, consequently,
could not at present carry out the rules laid down in Articles 1 and 3, under-
take to convert the mat6riel of their mines as soon as possible, so as to bring
it into conformity with the foregoing requirements.
Id.
62. These procedural aspects include the following provisions: Convention ap-
plies only between Contracting Powers, and only if all belligerents are Contracting
Powers, id. art. 7; procedure for'ratification, id. art. 8; nonsignatory procedure to
accede to the Convention, id. art. 9; date of effectiveness, id. art. 10, Convention to
remain in force seven years, and beyond, unless denounced, id. art. 11; provision for
re-opening of debate on mines, id. art. 12; provision for register, id. art. 13.
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nations. 63 It assumes that banning the use of mines is "impos-
sible," but nevertheless finds it desirable to regulate their use
"in order to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as far as
possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is enti-
tled, despite the existence of war.
' 6 1
63. Id. preface.
64. Id. At the close of the Conference, Sir Ernest Satow, delegate of Great Brit-
ain to the Conference, considered the articles one small step but criticised them as
being incomplete, and in so doing opened a classic exchange:
We declare, without hesitation, that the right of neutrals to security in navi-
gating the high seas should take precedence of the transient right of bel-
ligerents to make use of them as the place of warlike operations.
But the convention which has been adopted does not impose upon the belligerents a single
restriction as to the placing of cabled mines wherever it may seem to him desirable,
whether it be in his own territorial waters for purposes of defense, or in
those of the enemy for purposes of attack, or, finally, in the high seas, thus
necessarily causing great risks to neutral navigation in time of naval warfare
and, indeed, the probability of disasters. . . .This Convention. . .can not be
considered. . . a complete exposition of international law on the subject; and the legiti-
macy of such or such act can not be assumed simply because this convention has not
prohibited it.
W. HULL, supra note 35, at 98-99 (emphasis added). In reply, Germany's Baron Mar-
schall von Bieberstein stated:
That a belligerent who lays mines assumes a very heavy responsibility to-
wards neutrals and towards peaceful shipping is a point on which we are all
agreed. No one will resort to this instrument of warfare unless for military
reasons of an absolutely urgent character. But military acts are not solely
governed by stipulations of international law. There are other facts. Con-
science, good sense, and the sense of duty imposed by principles of human-
ity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the
most effective guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German navy, I
loudly proclaim it (je le dis A haute voix), will always fulfill in the strictest
fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of humanity and
civilization. I have no need to tell you that I entirely recognize the impor-
tance of the codification of rules to be followed in war. But it would be a
great mistake to issue rules the strict observation of which might be ren-
dered impossible by the law of facts. It is of the first importance that the
international maritime law which we desire to create should only contain
clauses the execution of which is possible from a military point of view-is
possible even in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise the respect for law
would be lessened and its authority undermined. . . .As to the humanita-
rian sentiments of which the British delegate has spoken, I cannot admit that
there is any country in the world which is superior to my country or my
Government in the sentiment of humanity.
I J. Scorr, supra note 35, at 586-87 (footnote omitted).
Germany set aside completely the honor and conscience which Baron von
Bieberstein so loudly proclaimed when, on February 4, 1915, it declared a "military
area," closing, by proclamation, the seas around the British Isles, (and later the Medi-
terranean), to all ships unwilling to face the prospect of unrestricted submarine war-
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The articles that effectively protect neutral shipping dur-
ing actual hostilities are the first, the third, and the fourth.65
They create a standard for mine use that all later standards
must reflect.66 Article 2 does not share this distinction due to
the near impossibility of proving a violation of this section.6 7
Proving in court that a belligerent laid mines "solely" for pur-
poses of a commercial blockade is so difficult a burden that it is
hard to imagine that any country could successfully demand its
enforcement. 6
8
The Hague Convention resulted in a standard for mine
use in wartime. The use of mines is legal for belligerent pur-
poses.6 9 Unanchored mines must have a one hour time limit,
but may be used anywhere.70 Anchored mines must become
harmless when free of anchorage. 71 If unsupervised, notifica-
tion of anchored mines must be given to neutrals.7 2 Anchored
mines may be used anywhere, unless used solely to effect a
commercial blockade. 73 The use of mines is also legal, during
war, by neutrals, in defense of neutrality. 4 The same limits
fare and freely floating mines constructed without time limitations. See 2 L. OPPEN-
HEIM, supra note 1, §§ 182a, 319a.
65. Hague Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1, 3-4. Note that these articles do not
contemplate the use of mines during peacetime. Rather, they are laws of war. See
infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text (by implication the International Court of
Justice a fortiori indicated in Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 22-23
(Judgment of Apr. 9) that the Hague Convention established a minimum standard
for legality of mine use in peacetime).
66. To the extent that the articles of the Hague Convention make provisions
respecting the basic variables of mine use, any later standard for mine use will either
conform to the Hague standard, or it will not; in either case, the later standard may
be said to reflect the Hague standard. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (defin-
ing the basic variables of mine use).
67. See W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 159; see also 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1,
§ 182a.
68. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a.
69. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface.
70. Id. art. 1. For the text of article 1, see supra note 55.
71. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
72. See id. art. 3. For the text of article 3, see supra note 57.
73. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 2. For the text of article 2, see supra
note 56. This prohibition against using mines solely to impose a commercial block-
ade does apply to floating mines, as well. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
However, the primary uses of floating mines are defensive, making them an unlikely
choice for blockade purposes. See C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 245-46; 2 L. OPPEN-
HELM, supra note 1, § 182a.
74. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 4. For the text of article 4, see supra
note 58.
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imposed on belligerents also apply to neutrals who use
mines,75 with the added requirement that neutrals must give
notification of mine use and location in advance. 76 It is un-
likely that neutral powers will ever have reason to use
anchored mines beyond their territorial waters because any
such use would no longer be in defense of neutrality.77
Since the standard exists for the protection of neutral
shipping, 78 the elements of the standard should be interpreted
from the viewpoint of a neutral shipper. All obligations arising
under the standard fall on the belligerent, or neutral, who
chooses to employ mines. 79 It follows that the neutral ship-
per's only duty is to take notice of mine use when notice is
given.
III. EVOLVING STANDARD OF MINE USE
In the years that followed 1907, both state practices and
technological advances modified the Hague standard.
A. State Practices in the Wars
Automatic submarine contact mines were used widely in
both World Wars, by all naval belligerents.8 " Both the extent
and character of mine use were beyond anything contemplated
by the drafters of the Hague Convention.8 These develop-
ments impinged upon and changed the character of neutrality.
In World War I, mines were used to close large areas of
the oceans to unauthorized passage by any ship.82 This was
initially a British response to the German strategic decision to
75. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
76. See id.
77. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, §§ 313, 316, 319, 319a. However, neutrals
may use any lawful means at their disposal, including unanchored mines, to discour-
age violation of their neutrality. This is essential to maintaining neutrality, because if
one belligerent violates a neutral's rights in a manner disadvantageous to the other
belligerent, that belligerent may also be expected to violate the same neutral's rights,
in the form of a reprisal. Id.; see also infra note 95 (discussing the rights of neutrals in
respect to war zones).
78. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface.
79. See id. arts. 1-6.
80. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a.
81. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
82. See 2 L. OPPENHEiM, supra note 1, § 182a; see also W. MALLISON, supra note 1,
at 159 (discussing the use of mines in the World Wars).
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engage in unrestricted submarine warfare.83 Much later in the
War, the Allied powers laid a mine barrage between the Ork-
ney Islands and the Norwegian coast.8 4 This closed passage
across 250 miles of ocean.8 5 The barrage took 70 thousand
mines to complete, of which 57 thousand were United States
Government property.86 Any ship which failed to stop in at an
Allied port and submit to a contraband search while there, en-
tered the minefields at its own risk, without benefit of an escort
or safe route from the Allies. 7
During World War II, the use of mines was even more ex-
tensive. 8 The Germans continued to use mines in violation of
83. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 25, §§ 559-60, 567; 2 L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a.
84. The United States note to Norway of August 27, 1918 described the mine
barrage:
The Government of the United States is also advised that the Norwegian
Government has been informed that the Governments of the United States
and Great Britain are engaged in laying a barrage across that portion of the
North Sea lying between Scotland and Norway, which when completed will
effectively prevent the passage of enemy submarines to and from the Atlan-
tic Ocean by the northern route through the North Sea provided that they
are not permitted illegal passage through the territorial waters of Norway.
W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 68 n.62 (quoting (1918) FOREIGN REL. U.S. Supp. No.
1, vol. 2, 1782-83 (1933)).
85. See C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 345.
86. See W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 68 n.62.
87. J. COOGAN, THE END OF NEUTRALITY 212-14 (1981); see infra note 93 (discuss-
ing Allied practices during the Wars).
88. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a. Coastal commerce was too impor-
tant to the British to simply close off their territorial waters with mines, and all ships
were vulnerable to submarine attack. Id. The solution was to mine extensively outside
the territorial waters, leaving a narrow protected band of open water around the
Isles. Id. n.l.
On April 12, 1940, after the invasion of Denmark and Norway by Germany,
the Admiralty announced that mines had been laid over a large area in the
Skagerrak (in which a channel twenty miles wide was left open) and the Kat-
tegat, and in the North Sea from a point near the Dutch coast to the Norwe-
gian coast. On April 14 a further minefield was announced to have been laid
in the whole of the Kattegat and in the Southern Baltic so as to cover the
whole of the German Baltic coast up to Swedish territorial waters. Germany
also laid mines in some of these areas. These developements tended in the direction
of a successful assertion of the right of the belligerent to lay mine-fields on the high seas
irrespective of reprisals but subject to the duty to ensure the relative safety of neutral
traffic. . . . [T]he British declaration . . . was the result of the view that
these areas were the actual theatre of war operations. On the other hand, it
would appear that the primary purpose of war zones as declared by Ger-
many was the destruction of commercial shipping.
Id. For a dissenting view concerning the italicized assertion, see R. TUCKER, THE LAw
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the Hague standard, first by constructing unanchored mines
without the required one hour time limitation, 9 and then by
seeding international waters with vast numbers of mines
dropped from airplanes."° The Allied response was predict-
able; they created defensive zones, and laid their own exten-
sive minefields.9
More significant than the extent to which mines were used
in the wars was the character of mine use. Characteristically,
mines were used to define and establish war zones, which were
of questionable legality, especially as to neutrals.9 2 In 1915 and
1917, Germany declared "military areas," closing, by procla-
mation, the seas around the British Isles, and the Mediterra-
nean, to all ships unwilling to face the prospect of unrestricted
submarine warfare and freely floating mines constructed with-
out time limitations.93
OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 296-305 (1955). Tucker considers the measures
taken in the declaration of war zones too controversial to achieve the international
legal status of customary law. See id.
89. As is required by the Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
90. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 25, § 567.
91. See supra note 87. The World War I practice of requiring neutrals to stop
into Allied ports to secure a safe route or escort was also revived. 2 L. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 1, § 390c.
92. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, §§ 313, 316, 319, 319a; infra note 95 (dis-
cussing the legality of the war zone).
93. R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 296-300; see 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1,
§ 319a. The exact order of events is not so condensed: Great Britain protested on
August 23, 1914, that the Germans were continuing their practice of scattering mines
indiscriminately in ordinary trade routes. Great Britain contended that "[tihese
mines do not become harmless after a certain number of hours; they are not laid in
connection with any definite military scheme . . . but appear to be scattered on the
chance of touching individual British war or merchant vessels." Id. § § 182a n. 1, 319a
(quoting an announcement of the British Admiralty, Aug. 23, 1914).
On November 3, 1914, Great Britain declared the North Sea to be a defensive
zone. See id. § 319a. On February 4, 1915, Germany declared the territorial waters
and seas around the British Isles to be a "military area." Id. Only later in the war, on
January 31, 1917, did Germany extend the proclamation to include the waters
around France, Italy, Greece, Asia Minor, and North Africa. Id. While both sides
declared their zones "in retaliation" for each other's conduct, it has been widely
noted that the German zone paid no heed to the interests of neutrals, while the Allied
zones were characterized by lip service, at the least, to neutral interests. Id. The
Allied zones, for example, had lanes through which safe passage could be granted.
This did, of course, necessitate a stop into an Allied port, and could result in the
confiscation of contraband cargoes destined for German ports. See J. COOGAN, supra
note 87, at 212-14.
The Declaration of London was the product of a conference in 1908, which was
never ratified, but which attempted to define the rights and obligations of neutrals,
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Great Britain was quick to condemn the German war zone,
and responded with the creation of a series of defensive zones
of its own.94 With respect to neutrals, the Allied war zone was
no more legal than the German war zone. 5 The Allied powers
and codify what was thought to be existing international law. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 1, § 292. It comprised rules respecting blockade, contraband, unneutral
service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer to neutral flag, enemy character, con-
voy, resistance to search, and compensation. Id. Though it was unratified, the Decla-
ration was observed, in steadily decreasing measure by both sides, until 1916. Id.
The Declaration of London was interpreted by the Allied powers to mean that
the destruction of neutral vessels was illegal, while the Germans found justification
for their tactic in the article which said a neutral prize could be destroyed if obser-
vance of the rule involved danger to a warship or success of operations. C. DAvIs,
supra note 35, at 344.
However, the United States did not subscribe to the German view, illegal subma-
rine warfare by Germany being the usual reason offered for the American entry into
the war. Id. at 345. The American note to Germany of February 10, 1915, indicated
early a strong American antipathy to the newly declared German military zone:
If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presump-
tion that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and
should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American
citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to
view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral
rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly rela-
tions now so happily subsisting between the two governments.
If such deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government
can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be
constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accounta-
bility for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be
necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to
American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the
high seas.
J. COOGAN, supra note 87, at 221.
94. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, §§ 182a, 319a; supra note 93 (discussing
the creation of Allied defensive zones).
95. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a; see alsoJ. COOGAN, supra note 87, at
224-25. Much has been written on the subject of the legality of war zones. The
authorites cited supra note 93 concur that war zones are legal between belligerents,
but vary on the question as to neutrals. The question is one of reprisal. In closing
large portions of the open ocean, belligerents place the hostile right before the right
to freedom of the seas. This can be justified if it is a reprisal. For example, if a
neutral nation does not possess the naval strength to prevent the ships of one bellig-
erent from passing through its waters, it has failed to defend its neutrality in a man-
ner detrimental to the other belligerent. In that situation, the "wronged" belligerent
is justified in passing through those same waters for purposes that are essentially
defensive. This would constitute a legal reprisal. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1,
§§ 313, 316, 319, 319a. This rationale would excuse British mine laying before the
United States' entry into the war, i.e., since the United States did not take steps to
defend itself from "illegal" German submarine warfare, to the detriment of the Brit-
ish, Britain was compelled to close the seas. SeeJ. COOGAN, supra note 87, at 222-23.
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proclaimed that the declaration of defensive zones was justified
by illegal acts of the enemy, and was thus a legal reprisal.96
This had the local effect within a defensive zone of elevating
the right of the belligerent to war on the seas above the right
to freedom of the seas for purposes of trade.97
The use of the war zone to effect a blockade had a lasting
impact on standards of mine 'use. While the Hague Confer-
ence did not prohibit the placement of anchored mines on the
high seas, their use had been primarily to effect a close block-
ade.9" This is not to say that the use of anchored mines was
not contemplated at all on the high seas, but at the time of the
Conference, anchored mines were much more likely to be
found in the territorial waters of belligerents.99 The "block-
ade" of the Germans in World War I was something entirely
new, going by a familiar name.'0 0 Rather than seeking to close
an enemy port to all ships, the World War I blockade sought to
close the high seas to all enemy ships and, indeed, all commer-
cial vessels having intercourse with the enemy.'01 In this man-
ner it became accepted practice to use anchored contact mines
as an instrument of warfare on the high seas.' 0 2
Waging war on this scale changed international law; the
very scope of the conflict upset traditional notions of neutral-
ity. 0 3 Whether or not merchantmen had been fitted for war,
they had become part of a larger intelligence network, and
96. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a; see also W. MALLISON, supra note 1,
at 68 n.62.
97. J. COOGAN, supra note 87, at 214. The author explains that:
By sowing mines in international waters, Britain deliberately replaced the
belligerent right of visit and search in the North Sea with a new rule: ex-
plode and sink. This action, which threatened to send American ships,
seamen, and cargoes to the bottom simply for exercising their basic right to
sail the high seas, was a direct contradiction of the principle of freedom of
the seas.
Id.
98. See supra note 43. The blockade of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War is
a typical example. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a.
99. See R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 283-91.
100. SeeJ. COOGAN, supra note 87, at 155-56.
101. See id. at 158-64. This growth of the concept of blockade reflected the
growing importance of economic warfare; the related concept of contraband under-
went similar development. R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 266 n.6.
102. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a.
103. See R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 50, 68; see also W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at
129-30 (discussing the change in neutrals' rights).
19851
306 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:286
posed a threat to German submarines. 10 4 Germany could not
tolerate any presence on the seas not clearly allied with its
cause. However, German submarines were not constructed
with the taking of prizes in mind, and so it became the German
policy to destroy ostensibly neutral vessels.'
The war zone concept thoroughly impeaches the tradi-
tional neutral status of innocent commerce by having the local
effect of elevating the right to war above the right to freedom
of the seas.' 0 6 There may, in fact, be no such thing as neutral
shipping left to protect. 1 7 To that extent, the declaration of a
war zone plainly runs contrary to the priorities of the Hague
Convention. 0 8 However, the declaration of a war zone is con-
sistent with the Hague standard to the extent that it serves to
notify neutral shipping of the existence and approximate loca-
tion of mines. In this respect, the war zone is in keeping with
article 3 of the Hague Convention. 0 9
State practices in the two World Wars resulted in the de
facto amendment of the 1907 standard." 0 In modification of
the previous requirements, the use of anchored mines in a war
zone required notification to neutrals."' Additionally, the un-
supervised use of anchored mines on the high seas without the
declaration of a war zone could no longer be considered
legal. 12
B. The Effect of Technological Advances on the Standard
The mines used in the World Wars were not the same as
those used in the Russo-Japanese War and therefore, were not
104. R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 68 n.50.
105. See C. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 344.
106. J. COOGAN, supra note 87, at 213-14.
107. R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 68-69.
108. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface; supra notes 63-64 and accom-
panying text (quoting from the preface).
109. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3; see supra note 57 (quoting the provi-
sions of article 3).
110. See supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text (discussing the 1907
standard).
111. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3; see supra note 57 (quoting the provi-
sions of article 3).
112. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3. Since the war zone has become the
customary notification to neutrals, no power failing to declare a war zone could claim
to have taken "every possible precaution" for the protection of neutrals, as is called
for in the Hague Convention. Id.
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the exact instruments contemplated by the Hague Confer-
ence."3 While the technological advancement of mines raised
questions as to the applicability of the Hague standard, it is
generally accepted that use of the modern mines may still be
adequately regulated to effect the desired safety of neutral
shipping." 4 While the neutral shipper's enjoyment of freedom
of the seas during wartime has suffered, one firm requirement
remains out of wartime practice, i.e. the best safeguard of neu-
tral shipping is still prompt notification of mine use and loca-
tion." 5 Notification is the essential criterion of legality, the ab-
sence of which renders the use of anchored mines on the high
seas illegal."16 Without notification, no power can claim that
"every possible precaution" had been taken to ensure the
safety of neutral shipping." 17
A customary law test has been proposed to determine the
113. See W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 160. Contact with mines was no longer
necessary to detonate them. Id.; see supra note I (discussing technological advances in
mines). Some mines used magnetic sensitivity to detect passing ships; others, called
acoustic mines, used sensitivity to vibration. W. MALuSON, supra note 1, at 160.
Modern mines are called smart mines, or influence mines, because they can differen-
tiate between minesweeping attempts and the passage of more substantial vessels. D.
O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 92, 96. Smart mines are also frequently programmed to
ignore the first or second acceptable targets to increase the chances of exploding in
the midst of a convoy, thereby causing greater destruction and trapping the lead
vessels further into the mine field. See id.
114. See W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 160. In light of significant technological
advances, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus might provide a legal defense against
claims of violations of the Hague Convention. One author feels that such a defense
would be unlikely to succeed:
It is generally accepted that the obligations of a treaty terminate if a change
occurs in the circumstances existing at the time of its conclusion--circum-
stances the continuation of which is to be deemed a condition of the contin-
uing validity of the treaty. . . . Certainly it is clearly established that one
party to a treaty may not terminate its obligations unilaterally solely on the
ground that it believes the doctrine rebus sic stantibus to be applicable to the
situation; it is necessary first to have confirmation of its applicability by some
impartial tribunal.
In actual practice, no international tribunal of high standing has ever re-
leased a party from its treaty duties on grounds only of rebus sic
stantibus . ...
R. HIGGINS, supra note 24, at 344; see M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 24, at
245.
115. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a.
116. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
117. See id.; supra note 112 (discussing the war zone as customary notification
under Hague Convention); see also 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 319a.
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legality of weaponry in both general and limited wars."' The
test involves "a determination of the reasonable proportional-
ity between the military efficiency of the weapon and the ancil-
lary destruction of values caused by its use.""' 9 This test ex-
plains in part why the modern mines remain legal: Increased
destructiveness does not result in a disproportionately greater
destruction of values.' 20 The test also accounts for the illegal-
ity of unrestricted mine use.' 2
1
IV. THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE
Following the World Wars came a period of renewed in-
ternationalism, and with the foundation of the United Nations,
a major change in international relations.' 22 In the previous
century, the balance of power between major powers existed
because of alliances and the threat of shifting from one alliance
to another. 123 The United Nations Charter directs that mem-
ber states shall not use force in international relations. 24 The
Security Council exists to direct international peace-keeping
forces, and enforce the Charter of the United Nations. 25 The
International Copirt of Justice (Court), as the judicial organ of
the United Nations, exists to facilitate the peaceful resolution
of conflicts and disputes between powers. 26 To ensure that
118. W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 182.
119. Id.
120. See generally id. The value destroyed by unrestricted mines use are those of
freedom of navigation and freedom from attack without warning, and neutral status,
in general. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 182a. In addition, unrestricted mine use
is not necessarily more militarily efficient than restricted mine use. See W. MALLISON,
supra note 1, at 160. For example, long-lived floating mines may survive long after
the close of hostilities and appear in places distant from their original locations, pos-
ing a hazard to the mine laying power's own military and merchant fleets. See W.
HULL, supra note 35, at 94.
121. See W. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 160.
122. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 24, at 46-47.
123. Id. at 30-55.
124. See U.N. CHARTER preface.
125. See id. arts. 23-51.
126. See id. arts. 92-96. The advent of the United Nations and the International
Court of Justice in 1946 ended the 22 year history of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OPINION BRIEFS V (Section of In-
ternational Law, American Bar Assoc. ed. 1978). Access to the Court is available to
all members of the United Nations, signatories of the Statute of the International
Court, and nonmember, nonsignatory states that have the recommendation of the
United Nations Security Council. Id. In addition to hearing contentious cases, the
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these functions are resorted to in times of difference, the mem-
ber states renounce the use of force in international
relations. 127
The rationale for the continued use of force in interna-
tional relations is familiar: The use of force is justified, at least
in self-defense, by the continuing illegal conduct of interna-
tional actors. 28 Despite the continued use of force in interna-
tional relations, the United Nations system of dispute resolu-
tion has had the opportunity to adjudicate several cases. One
such is the Corfu Channel case.' 29
International claims and counterclaims arose out of an in-
cident on October 22, 1946, in which two British destroyers
struck mines in the North Corfu Channel, in Albanian territo-
rial waters.130 The United Kingdom held Albania responsible
Court is also empowered to render advisory opinions on questions submitted to it by
organs of the United Nations. Id. at vi.
The Court consists of fifteen members elected for nine-year terms by the
General Assembly and Security Council, each proceeding independently,
from a list of nominees provided by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. Although judges are elected without regard to nationality, the
Court itself must be representative of the main forms of civilization and the
principal legal systems of the world. In addition, a party may designate an
ad hoc judge to participate in a case with the same authority as the regular
judges if none of the members of the Court are of its nationality.
Id.
127. See U. N. CHARTER arts. 2, para 4, art. 51.
128. See M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 24, at 214. In her address to
the joint luncheon of the American Society of International Law and the Section of
International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association on April 12, 1984,
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, then United States Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that
"unilateral compliance with [the United Nations'] charter's principles of noninterven-
tion and nonuse of force may make sense in some specific isolated instances, but are
hardly a sound basis for either U.S. policy or for international peace and stability."
Taylor, Mrs. Kirkpatrick Chides Latin Critics, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
She also stated that "the legalistic approach to international affairs" was inadequate
to cope with the realities of Communist aggression and subversion, but stopped
short of saying that the United States should disregard international law. Id.
129. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
130. Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings (I
Corfu Channel) 20-21, 25, annexes 10-14 (Memorial dated Sept. 30, 1947) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Memorial]. On October 22, 1946, two British warships, H.M.S. Saumarez
and H.M.S. Volage, struck mines while passing through the North Corfu Channel. Id.;
see I. CHUNG, supra note 12, at 20. Forty-four lives were lost, 42 were injured; one
ship was a total loss, and the other crippled. Id. Britain announced a sweep of the
channel. "[I]n view of the serious accidents which recently occurred to two of His
Majesty's warships passing through the Corfu Channel and of which the Albanian
authorities are no doubt aware, British mining authorities will shortly sweep the
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for the loss of life and property, claiming that Albania had
omitted to notify peaceful shipping when all the circumstantial
evidence indicated that the mines could not have been laid
without Albanian knowledge or connivance. 31 The United
Kingdom had swept the channel, and in so doing had violated
Albanian territorial waters, entering the mouth of Saranda har-
bor and coming within 300 yards of the shore. 32
Both countries took their complaints to the United Na-
tions Security Council, where it was decided that the body
lacked the factfinding capability to judge the dispute, and re-
ferred the dispute to the evidentiary expertise of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.1 3 The British Memorial to the Court
made the following points: 1) North Corfu Channel had been
swept at the end of the war under the direction of the Central
Mine Clearance Board; 3 4 2) It was known that the channel was
safest along the Albanian coast because German minefields
channel." Memorial, supra, at 72 (note from the Government of the United Kingdom
to the Government of Albania, Oct. 26, 1946). The operation was carried out under
the observation of Capitaine de Fregate R. Mestre, the French member of the Central
Mine Clearance Board, see infra note 134, but without the express consent of that
international body. See I. CHUNG supra note 12, at 26, 32.
131. Memorial, supra note 130, at 20-21.
132. I. CHUNG, supra note 12, at 22-23. The Government of Albania related the
incident as follows:
Since the morning of 12 November a large number of warships flying the
British flag have been sailing all over the waters off the southern Albanian
shore between Butrinto and Carab Ouron. All the British vessels navigated
in battle formation in our territorial and extra-territorial waters in token of
intimidation and provocation.
Today, 13 November 1946, at 10 a.m. and throughout the whole day, a large
number of British warships and minesweepers varying in number from hour
to hour between eleven and twenty-three entered our territorial waters at
Santiquaranta at five hundred, one thousand, one thousand and five hun-
dred metres from the port on the pretext of clearing mines. British warships
frequently fired machine-gun bursts in the air and into the water with a view
to creating incidents.
Id. at 24-25 (quoting Telegram from the Government of Albania to the Secretary
General of the United Nations (Nov. 13, 1946)).
133. Memorial, supra note 130, at 37, 387-93.
134. I. CHUNG, supra note 12, at 26. The Central Mine Clearance Board was
constituted after the War:
In order to carry out the task of removing remaining mines, the Interna-
tional Central Mine Clearance Board was set up in November 1945, by
agreement between the Governments of the Soviet-Union, the United
States, the United Kingdom and France. On the recommendation of the
Central Board, other Powers had been invited to become members of the
Zone Boards. The Mediterranean Zone Board consisted of representatives
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still remained to the west; and 3) The minesweeping operation
had produced newly laid mines close to the Albanian coastline,
where the Albanian authorities had to have been aware of the
mine laying operation.13 5
The British allegation was that the laying of the minefield
constituted a violation of articles 2 through 5 of the Hague
Convention,1 36 and absent the Hague Convention, that the lay-
ing of such a minefield was a crime against humanity.13 7 Alba-
nia at all times denied knowledge of any minefield in its territo-
rial waters, and persisted in pressing charges that its national
sovereignty had been violated.' 38
When the International Court of Justice finally reached
the merits of the British claim, the Court indicated the follow-
ing: Control by a state of its territorial waters neither involves
automatic responsibility for acts committed there, nor does it
shift the burden of proof to the sovereign power. 139 The ques-
tion was thus one of the extent of Albanian knowledge. 40 Al-
of France, Greece, the Soviet-Union, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Yugoslavia.
Id. Certain other governments had been invited to send observers, but Albania was
not so invited because it possessed no mine-sweeping forces. Id.; see Memorial, supra
note 130, at 54 (annex 3 to No. I, International agreement between the governments
to the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, setting up
the International Central Mine Clearance Board (Nov. 22, 1945)).
135. Memorial, supra note 130, at 22, 48-52.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Contre-Memoire du Gouvernement Albanais (U.K. v. Alb.), 1950 I.C.J.
Pleadings (2 Corfu Channel) 55, 138-46.
139. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Judgment of Apr. 9). The
Court acknowledged a degree of state responsibility for illegal acts occurring within
the waters of a state, i.e., the duty to give some explanation, but went on to state:
But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a
State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought
to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it neces-
sarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart
from other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor
shifts the burden of proof.
Id.
140. Id. at 22. The Court formulated the issue as one of obligation to notify.
Albania's obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in her wa-
ters depends on her having obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient
time before October 22nd; and the duty of the Albanian coastal authorities
to warn the British ships depends on the time that elapsed between the mo-
ment that these ships were reported and the moment of the first explosion.
Id.; see also I. CHUNG, supra note 12, at 157, 166.
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bania had not disputed the consequences of knowledge of the
minefield, and had agreed that knowledge would involve inter-
national responsibility. 1 4 ' The Court stated Albania's legal ob-
ligations plainly, and in so doing created an international stan-
dard for the peacetime use of mines:
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities
consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general,
the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters
and in warning the approaching British warships of the im-
minent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such
obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No.
VIII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and
well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations
of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the
principle of the freedom of maritime communications; and
every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."' 2
Ultimately, the Court held Albania liable for the British lives
and property lost on October 22, 1946, and the British liable
to the Albanians for invasion of sovereign Albanian waters
during the British minesweeping operation. 43
The Court in no way indicated that the use of mines dur-
ing peacetime was illegal per se, which would suggest that the
peacetime use of mines is legal in defense of sovereignty. The
appropriate standard for mine use in peacetime is logically the
neutral wartime standard. There is an added requirement that
states laying mines in peacetime should in no way obstruct the
innocent passage of any ship through any portion of its territo-
rial waters that functions as an international highway. "14
141. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 22 (Judgment of Apr. 9); see
also I. CHUNG, supra note 12, at 157.
142. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 22-23 (Judgment of Apr. 9)
(emphasis added).
143. Id. at 23, 35.
144. Id. at 28. The Court expressed this standard by stating:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance
with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send
their warships through straits used for international navigation between two
parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal State,
provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an in-
ternational convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such
passage through straits in time of peace.
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The Corfu Channel decision, in respect to the use of mines,
may be said to stand for the proposition that mine use during
peacetime is legal, and while not covered by the Hague Con-
vention, is bound by a stricter standard of use in which free-
dom of the seas is determinative.' 45 The British Ambassador
to the United Nations anticipated this result when he stated in
his address to the Security Council that anything violative of
the Hague standard of mine use was illegal a fortiori during
peacetime in that any such offense is clearly repugnant to free-
dom of the seas. 14 6
V. SYNTHESIS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LA W
STANDARD RELATIVE TO THE LAYING OF
A UTOMA TIC SUBMARINE MINES
The importance of law to the international community is
greater today than ever before in history. 47 Peace no longer
depends upon the precarious balancing of alliances, as it did in
1907.148 Rather, peace today hinges upon the ability of oppos-
ing blocs of nations to exist in amicable relations all over the
world. 149 Today, as never before, the consequences of war are
extreme and final. There is developing a body of practices
whereby international law provides a mutually acceptable set
of rules for the peaceful resolution of disputes. 150
That automatic submarine mines still give cause for inter-
national concern is evident from international debate and dis-
145. See supra note 142.
146. I. CHUNG, supra note 12, at 33 (quoting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassa-
dor of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Security Council).
147. See M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 24, at v-vi.
148. Id. at 41-50.
149. Id. at 50-55.
150. 1J. ScoTr, supra note 35, at 108-09. After accepting the presidency of the
Second Hague Peace Conference, on June 15, 1907, M. de Nelidow opened his
address:
This task, gentlemen, as outlined in the program of the Conference and
accepted by all the governments, is composed of two parts. On the one
hand, we are to seek the means of settling in a friendly manner any differ-
ences which may arise among the nations, and of thus preventing ruptures
and armed conflicts. On the other hand, we must endeavor, if war has bro-
ken out, to mitigate its burdens both for the combatants themselves, and for
those who may be indirectly affected.
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cord attending the recent uses to which they have been put.'
While it may never be simple to determine when the use of
force is justified in international relations,1 2 it is possible to
adopt universal, humanizing standards as to the manner in
which force is employed. 153 A standard for the legal use of au-
tomatic submarine mines may be synthesized from the past
practices under the Hague Convention and the Corfu Channel
case.'
54
The goal of the standard is to insure the safety of all
peaceful shipping from attack without notice or justification; in
short, to preserve the freedom of the seas.' 55 The priorities of
this standard are in keeping with those of the Hague Conven-
tion, namely that the right to freedom of the seas is superior to
the right of any belligerent to war on the seas. 156 However,
this standard acknowledges the totality of naval war in its pres-
ent state of sophistication, and accommodates the inevitable by
recognition of the war zone. The legal effect of the war zone is
the local promotion of the right of the belligerent to war on
the seas over the neutral shipper's right to freedom of the
151. The Soviet Union was quick to call the mining of Nicaraguan harbors which
damaged a Soviet freighter a "grave crime," committed with the complicity of the
United States. Burns, Moscow Holds U.S. Responsible for Mines Off Nicaragua's Ports, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 22, 1984, at AI, col. 3 (quoting a protest note handed by Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko to the American charg6 d'affairs, Warren Zimmerman). In
a letter to the President of Colombia, the French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson,
is quoted as calling the mining of Nicaraguan ports "a blockade undertaken in time
of peace against a small country, which presents a serious problem of political eth-
ics." France Said to Offer to Help Nicragua Clear Ports of Mines, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1984,
at A7, col. 1 (quoting a Sandinista Press release). On April 4, the United States used
its privileged role in the United Nations Security Council to veto a resolution con-
demning the mining of Nicaraguan ports. U.S. Vetoes U.N. Bid to Condemn Mining of
Nicaraguan Ports, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1984, at A8, col. 1. The results of the vote were
13 for, the United States against, and Britain abstaining. Id. But by April 6, Britain,
too, had voiced its concern for what it perceived as a threat to the principle of free-
dom of the seas. Smith, Britain Criticizes Mining of Harbors Around Nicaragua, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 4 (quoting remarks of Andrew Burns, press coun-
selor of the British Embassy).
152. See M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 24, at 201-28.
153. See 1 J. Sco-r, supra note 35, at 108-09.
154. See infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
155. This has consistently been the purpose of mine use restraint. See Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9); Hague Convention, supra
note 2, preface.
156. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface.
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seas. 157 The value of the war zone to neutral shippers is that,
since they are at least given warning, 158 they know their legal
rights before compromising them.
A synthesis of the Hague Convention requirements as
they emerged from World War II, and the peacetime standard
for mine use found in Corfu Channel yields a customary interna-
tional standard regarding the use of automatic submarine
mines. The use of mines is legal, in war, for belligerent pur-
poses.' 59 Unanchored mines must have a one hour time limit,
and may be used anywhere.' 60 Anchored mines must become
harmless when free of anchorage.' 6' If unsupervised, or in a
war zone, notification of anchored mines must be given to neu-
trals. 162 Anchored mines may be used anywhere, unless used
solely to effect a commercial blockade, but unsupervised use
on the high seas without the declaration of a war zone cannot
be considered legal.' 61
The use of mines is also legal in war by neutrals, in de-
fense of neutrality.' 64 Unanchored mines must have a one
hour time limit, and may be used anywhere. 165 Anchored
mines must become harmless when free of anchorage. 166 Neu-
tral countries laying mines must give notification of their use
and location in advance via the diplomatic channel. 167 They
may only use mines in defense of neutrality, and anchored
mines only within their territorial waters.
68
The use of mines is legal, during peace, for neutral pur-
poses. 169 States laying mines during peacetime may only use
anchored mines that become harmless when free of their
157. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 25, §§ 558-61; supra
note 97 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 80-112 (discussing the inception of the war zone, its effects
on neutral's rights, and its contribution to norms of mine use).
159. Hague Convention, supra note 2, preface.
160. Id. art. 1.
161. Id.
162. Id. art. 3.
163. Id. arts. 2-3; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
164. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
165. Id. arts. 1, 4.
166. Id.
167. Id. art. 4.
168. Id.; see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
169. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Judgment of Apr. 9);
supra notes 129-46 (discussing the evolution of this standard).
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anchorage.170 They must also give notification of their use and
location in advance via the diplomatic channel. 7 ' During
peacetime, states laying mines in their territorial waters may do
so in defense of sovereignty, but only if such territorial waters
are not a strait connecting two open bodies of ocean.172
This standard reflects the origin of mine use regulation in
that it draws its considerations from the Hague Convention.173
It further reflects standards of mine use observed by the great
world powers during the World Wars, at variance with the
Hague Convention, that are both widespread and consistent
enough to be deemed customary under international law. 1 74
Lastly, the standard reflects the holdings of the International
Court of Justice regarding the use of mines during peace-
time.' 75 Any use of mines inconsistent with the standard is ille-
gal and incurs international responsibility. 176
VI. RECENT MINE USE IN NICARAGUA AND
THE RED SEA
Using the criteria that emerged from the Hague Confer-
ence, 1 7 7 it is possible to evaluate the legal nature of recent
mine use in Nicaragua and the Red Sea.'17  In Nicaragua, a
state of civil unrest exists.1 79 It is unclear whether wartime or
peacetime standards apply.8 0 If mines are being employed for
170. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 22-23 (Judgment of Apr. 9);
see also Hague Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1, 4.
171. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Judgment of Apr. 9);
Hague Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3, 4.
172. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 ICJ. 4, 28 (Judgment of Apr. 9);
supra note 144 (discussing the right of innocent passage).
173. See Hague Convention, supra note 2; supra note 49 and accompanying text
(defining the variables dealt with by the Convention).
174. See supra notes 80-121 and accompanying text.
175. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (judgment of Apr. 9); see supra
notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
176. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9); see
supra notes 142-45 (discussing liability for violation of peacetime standards of mine
use).
177. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing relevant variables).
178. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text (discussing the details of re-
cent mine use).
179. See U.S. Vetoes U.N. Bid to Condemn Mining of Nicaraguan Ports, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 5, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
180. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 75a. See generally id. §§ 7 1-75 g. The
issue is one of recognition. Traditionally, a series of objective criteria existed to de-
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belligerent purposes, knowledge of this is of vital importance
to shipping. It would alert innocent commerce of the possible
presence of mines on the high seas, not merely in the territo-
rial waters of Nicaragua, as one would expect during peacetime
mine use.' 8 1 As there is no general condition of war existing at
sea, and one party to the belligerency does not even possess an
identifiable navy,18 2 wronged parties may wish to argue that
termine when an internal armed resistance to a sovereign authority was organized
enough and successful enough to constitute a rebellion, and thereby invoke the law
of war between the parties. Id. § 75a(c). An intermediate stage exists, in which third
states recognize the rebels as insurgents:
Where a status of insurgency exists, there is in effect an international ac-
knowledgement of an internal war, but third parties are left substantially
free to determine the consequences. . . . [Third states are] still free, under
traditional international law, to help the legitimate government, but should
desist from helping the rebels. . . . Recognition of insurgency creates a fac-
tual relation in the meaning that legal rights and duties as between insur-
gents and outside states exist only insofar as they are expressly conceded
and agreed upon for reasons of convenience, of humanity, or of economic
interest.
Higgins, International Law and Civil Conflict, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
CIVIL WARS 163, 170 (E. Luard ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
A state of belligerency is easier to determine. A state of belligerency exists when
an armed conflict meets four criteria: 1) The armed conflict must be widespread;
2) The rebels must occupy and administrate a substantial portion of territory; 3) The
conduct of hostilities must be in accordance with the rules of war and through armed
forces responsible to an identifiable authority; and 4) Circumstances must exist which
make it necessary for third parties to define their attitude by acknowledging the sta-
tus of belligerency. Id. at 170-71.
The current international usage seems to treat recognition subjectively and as a
function of political convenience, thereby making it difficult to determine the status
of the parties to the Nicaraguan conflict. See M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note
24, at 128-34. The rebels do not control any significant amount of Nicaraguan terri-
tory, being based in the neighboring countries of Costa Rica and Honduras, nor are
they organized, in the sense of comprising a single ideological movement which an-
swers to a central authority. See C.I.A. Threats Said to Influence Rebels, N.Y. Times, Apr.
22, 1984, at Al col. 6, at A10, col. 1. Traditionally these factors would militate
against recognizing a state of civil war. Today, the United States recognizes an insur-
gency, defined supra note 4, indicating that the United States does not regard the
existence and purposes of the insurgents as illegal. See REPORT OF THE SELECT SEN-
ATE COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 665, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1984). This
is not to be taken to mean that the United States recognizes the insurgents as having
all the rights of a belligerent. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, §§ 71-75g.
181. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1, 4 (discussing the differences
between neutral and belligerent use of mines); see also notes 142-46 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the peacetime standard of mine use derived from Coru Channel).
182. Nicaraguan rebels do have some launches and other small craft. See Kinzer,
Nicaragua, Citing Raids, Says Rebels Have New Skills, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1984, at A3,
col. 4.
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the more exacting peacetime standards apply.'13  Peacetime
standards would not recognize as valid the declaration of Nica-
raguan waters to be a war zone, which might otherwise excuse
some damage as the result of an assumed risk. 18 4 Also, the
customary law test may indicate a significant disproportion be-
tween the military efficiency of mining in a civil war and the
resulting destruction of values. 85 For instance, it may be ac-
ceptable in a general war to jeopardize all external maritime
relations in return for a secure coast, while it may not be ac-
ceptable to do so in a civil war. First, in civil war there may not
be as high a degree of military efficiency in blockading the na-
tion's ports where the state's waters are not truly the zone of
hostilities, as it would be in a general war. Second, the de-
struction of values may be proportionately greater than in a
general war, i.e. if one party to a civil war closes maritime com-
merce, both sides in the struggle may starve, or be put to equal
disadvantage.
Regardless of whether the declaration and imposition of a
war zone is legal, the use of long-lived floating mines would
remain illegal.' 86 At least one nation has determined that the
damage to its ship which occurred off Nicaraguan shores was
183. In that situation, an injured party might seek reparations from the Nicara-
guan Government, invoking the Corfu Channel argument that the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment would become responsible if it knew of a minefield in their territorial waters,
yet failed to warn neutral shipping. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4,
22-23 (Judgment of Apr. 9); see also supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing this argument).
184. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 22 (Judgment of Apr. 9);
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3. This was undoubtedly what the rebels hoped
to achieve by the declaration of a war zone: 'The coasts of Nicaragua are a war zone,
and therefore we are not responsible for the loss of civilian lives in this zone." Kin-
zer, Nicaraguan Port Thought to Be Mined, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984, at A3, col. 3
(quoting a release of March 1, 1984, by the rebel Democratic Revolutionary Alliance,
based in Costa Rica).
185. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. The underlying notion is
proportionality. The test balances the relative gains and losses of a given military
course of action in varying contexts, such as general and limited wars. W. MALLISON,
supra note 1, at 182. Thus the application of this test to a decision to mine harbors in
the context of a civil war seeks to determine if there is a reasonable proportionality
between the military gains to the rebels, and the significant costs to the rebels. Since
they aspire to belligerent status and recognition as the legal rulers of Nicaraguan
territory, one of the conditions the rebels would traditionally have to satisfy is an
adherence to the laws of war. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 75a(a).
186. Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
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most probably caused by a long-lived floating mine. 87 Article
1 of the Hague Convention prohibits the use of long-lived
floating mines 8 8 and custom has upheld that prohibition. 8 9 If
in fact this is the case, then the efforts made to notify neutral
shipping of a war zone were meaningless acts, in that knowl-
edge of where a minefield was laid is useless if it is free to drift.
Logic dictates that no one is safe from an active mine whose
location is unknown.
If anchored mines were being used after all, then the issue
remaining is whether peacetime or wartime standards apply.
Nicaraguan rebels repeatedly announced their intention to
mine Nicaraguan waters, declaring them to be a war zone. 90
Further, they stated the goal of the mining was to exclude arms
shipments which they alleged were to be used in a genocidal
campaign against the Miskito Indians, meaning that they were
not using mines solely to effect a commercial blockade.' 9' If
wartime standards do in fact apply, then the issue becomes
whether notification was adequate as to specificity of location,
promptness, and scope of reach. 9 2
In the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez cases the relevant facts
187. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Port Thought to Be Mined, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984,
at A3, col. 3 (referring to the results of the Dutch Navy report); see also supra note 13
(discussing relevant details of the report).
188. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
189. See supra notes 80-121 and accompanying text (discussing state practices in
the World Wars).
190. See Kinzer, Nicaraguan Port Thought to Be Mined, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1984,
at A3, col. 3 (quoting a release of March 1, 1984, by the rebel Democratic Revolu-
tionary Alliance based in Costa Rica). A Honduras-based group called the Nicara-
guan Democratic Force, led by Adolfo Calero Portocarrero claimed that critics of the
mining failed to recognize the importance of disrupting navigation around Nicara-
guan ports. Kinzer, Mining to Continue, Rebel Chief Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at
AI0, col. 1. "These people do not realize that we are at war .... We consider Nica-
raguan harbors to be war zones. We assert our right to continue mining Nicaraguan
harbors in order to stop the massive flow of Soviet arms which are intended for use in
a genocidal campaign against Miskito Indians and Nicaraguan peasants." Id. (quot-
ing Adolfo Calero Portocarrero).
191. Kinzer, Mining to Continue, Rebel Chief Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at
AI0, col. 1. Use of mines solely to effect a commercial blockade is prohibited by the
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
192. See R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 301. A declaration of a war zone without
identifiable parameters is a meaningless exercise, to the extent that it affords neutral
shipping no real protection. Id. Promptness of notification to neutral governments
and shippers is required by the Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
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are better established.193 There was no war to justify mining in
the region.' 94 The purpose for the mine laying was not neu-
tral, 195 nor was it belligerent in the sense of sinking the ships
of the enemy and its allies.' 9 6 No country or group has in fact
claimed credit for the incidents.' 97 What is known is that
anchored mines were used without notification on an interna-
tional highway.' 98 This usage violates articles 3 and 6 of the
Hague Convention, the standard of which applies a fortiori in
peacetime. 199 In fact, no peacetime use of mines may be justi-
fied other than in the territorial waters of a power, and then
only with the notification of innocent international shipping.
200
It is apparent that the Red Sea cases are prima facie inter-
national wrongs. 20 1 No steps were taken to protect innocent
shipping and the mining served no discernable political
193. Underwater explosions damaged 18 merchant ships in the Gulf of Suez and
the Red Sea between early July and early September of 1984. Miller, 'Minelike' Object
Off Egypt Is Linked to Russians, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at A13, col. 1. Egypt, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States cooperated to
sweep the waters off Egypt and Saudi Arabia during August and September. Id. The
British ship H.M.S. Gavinton found a mine-like object in the sea-bottom of the north-
western part of the Gulf of Suez, approximately 15 miles south of the exit of the Suez
Canal. Id.
194. The only belligerency in the region affecting commerce is between Iran
and Iraq. See Miller, Suez Canal Eases Back to Normal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1984, at A3,
col. 1.
195. Neutral mine laying requires notification to innocent shipping in advance,
and, except for the use of unanchored mines in defense of neutral status, occurs only
within the territorial waters of a nation. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
196. Since no recognized belligerency exists in the region, no legitimate bellig-
erent use of mines is possible. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
197. See Miller, 'Minelike' Object Off Egypt Is Linked to Russians, N.Y. Times, Sept.
25, 1984, at A13, col. 1. It was reported that continuing recriminations between
Egypt and Libya concerned the probable source of the mine-laying. Id. No group
has since claimed credit for the incidents.
198. See id. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez form the approach to the Suez
Canal, an international highway of great strategic and commercial value. Because
this canal saves ships the 5,000 mile passage around the Cape of Good Hope, al-
lowing the oil resources of the Middle East to reach Europe and America at a sub-
stantially reduced cost, the area is heavily trafficked by ships of all nations. Miller,
Suez Canal Eases Back to Normal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
199. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale be-
hind this position).
200. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (discussing peacetime stan-
dards for mine use).
201. Like the mining of the North Corfu Channel in 1946, this mining was a
legally indefensible attack on innocent commerce without notification or cause. See
generally Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
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goals. 20 2 Every civilized nation condemned the mining, 20 3 and
several, the United States among them, mounted the interna-
tional minesweeping effort that produced the incriminating
204mine.
The United States at the same time sponsored the mining
efforts of Nicaraguan rebels which resulted in demonstrable in-
jury to innocent commerce. 20 5 The United States has ac-
counted for this by offering the justification of self-defense.20 6
The legal justification of the use of force is important but it is
not all: It only justifies the use of those certain kinds of force
which are not prohibited by the laws of war.20 7 While the facts
and circumstances of the mining operations are not public
knowledge,20 8 the question has been raised: Was the custom-
ary international standard of mine usage observed?
CONCLUSION
The recent lawless use of automatic submarine mines has
served to bring to light the importance of international stan-
dards in the manner of their use. While existing international
law has enjoyed mixed observance, intervening history sup-
ports the existence of customary international norms of mine
usage. Those norms, drawn from the Hague Convention, are
202. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. The only possible political goal
to be served by this kind of attack on innocents is the promulgation of terror. See
supra note 5. Usually terrorist violence against innocents is accompanied by prompt
publicity for the terrorist cause. See Jenkins, supra note 5, at 16. In the absence of
such claims of credit, only the broadest kind of speculation as to motive is possible.
203. This is evidenced by the broad international support of Egyptian mine-
sweeping efforts. See supra note 193.
204. See Miller, 'Minelike' Object Off Egypt Is Linked to Russians, N.Y. Times, Sept.
25, 1984, at A13, col. 1.
205. See supra notes 11-18 (discussing the available details of United States-
sponsored mining of Nicaraguan harbors).
206. President's State of the Union Address, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 140,
146 (Feb. 6, 1985). President Reagan stated that United States support of demo-
cratic revolutionary groups in Latin America was legally defensible under the UN
Charter as self defense. Id.
207. See R. TUCKER, supra note 88, at 50.
208. Briefings made before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are not
publicly available. The 1984 report of that Committee does acknowledge a United
States role in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, but gives no details at all concerning
the mining. REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No.
665, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984).
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still valid today, despite the technological changes in mines
and the addition of the war zone to the belligerent's arsenal.
Juden Justice Reed
